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Justice Brennan and the Religion Clauses
Nadine Strossent
Thank you so much for that gracious introduction. I really
am sorry that I have to talk and run because I enjoy the par-
ticipatory aspect of these forums much more than the lecture
mode, as my students can tell you. When I was asked to speak
here, though, I knew that immediately following my talk I would
have to leave in order to get to my constitutional law class on
time. I consider my teaching responsibilities sacrosanct. When I
was a practicing lawyer, I would never dream of being late for
court, and to me the idea of being late for class is pretty much in
the same category. I'm sure all of you students in the audience
feel the same way about going to your classes, right?! So I apolo-
gize in advance.
Right before I got here, I received a telephone call from the
ACLU national office telling me that the Supreme Court had
just decided to review a case in which the future of the religion
clauses will be at issue. It is a case involving a religious invoca-
tion at a public school,1 and will require the Court to evaluate
the scope of the establishment clause, which mandates separa-
tion of church and state.' During recent terms, this issue has
very badly divided the Court, with splintered votes among mul-
tiple concurring and dissenting opinions.3 Four members of the
Court probably would vote to endorse a very narrow view of the
establishment clause: that it only prohibits the establishment of
a national religion and discrimination among religions. In their
view, the establishment clause would not prohibit government
t Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. Harvard Radcliffe College; J.D.
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1. Lee v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305
(1991).
2. That clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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preference of religion per se, as long as no particular religion is
disadvantaged or favored vis-a-vis any other religion.4 This is
one of many areas where we cannot predict how Justice Souter
would rule." Therefore, in a few months, I might well be stand-
ing up here presenting a different description of the establish-
ment clause from the one that was advocated by Justice Bren-
nan, which I am going to be describing today.
I. Justice Brennan's General Role
Before focusing on Justice Brennan's religion clause juris-
prudence, I would like to say a few words about his role on the
Court more generally. From the introduction by Professor
Gershman, you have already gained some appreciation of what a
unique contribution Justice Brennan has made to individual
rights.
At the outset of all constitutional law courses, students read
opinion after opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall, and many
of my students come to admire him as the chief architect of the
Constitution in the sense of establishing both the judicial review
power of the federal courts and the significant power of the fed-
eral legislative branch.
Just as Chief Justice Marshall can be viewed as the prime
architect of the Constitution, we can look upon Justice Brennan
as the prime architect of the Bill of Rights.' He was the Justice
who most consistently and most effectively was able to help
translate those "parchment barriers," as James Madison called
them,' into actual enforceable individual freedoms.
Unfortunately, there is a big gap between when our Bill of
Rights was ratified, exactly two hundred years ago as of Decem-
ber 15th of this year, and when it first started to become en-
forceable and actually to give individuals and minority groups
redressable causes of action in the courts. That did not start
4. See id. at 655-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in piat, joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., White & Scalia, J.J.).
5. After this lecture was presented, Justice Thurgood Marshall resigned from the
Supreme Court, making it even more difficult to predict whether the Court's extant reli-
gion clause jurisprudence will be carried forward in future rulings.
6. This metaphor previously was used by Professor Laurence Tribe. See Tribe, Ar-
chitect of the Bill of Rights, 77 A.BA J. 47 (1991).




happening until the present century. Indeed, although Marbury
v. Madison8 - thanks to Justice Marshall back in
1803 - gave the Court the power to overturn an act of Con-
gress as violating the Constitution, I am fond of asking audi-
ences if they realize when the Court first actually exercised that
power to hold that a congressional statute violated the first
amendment's free speech clause. Even many law students and
lawyers are surprised to learn that this did not happen until
1965.9 And similarly long delays occurred before the Court en-
forced other provisions in the Bill of Rights.10
I think it is especially important for us to recognize this gap
between the existence of the Bill of Rights and its enforcement,
at this moment in history, for two reasons. First, we are entering
an era during which we can expect the Supreme Court and fed-
eral courts to be less active in interpreting and enforcing the Bill
of Rights. Second, the United States is increasingly serving as a
role model for other countries that are newly democratized and
for the first time writing their own constitutions and bills of
rights. It is important to impress on these other countries that
while having individual rights guaranteed on paper is certainly a
significant first step, many other steps need to be taken to trans-
form those paper guarantees into actual liberties. I think Justice
Brennan will go down in history as playing a particularly crucial
role in that process. That has been agreed upon both by people
who share his vision and by those who do not.
Justice Brennan's unique role sets him apart from another
Justice whom I admire and who shared many of Justice Bren-
nan's ideological positions: Justice William 0. Douglas. Several
years ago, I had the honor of participating in a commemorative
conference in Justice Douglas' honor at the University of Wash-
ington in Seattle. Justice Douglas was from Washington, and
had maintained close ties to that state. So, in 1989, to mark the
50th anniversary of his appointment to the Supreme Court, a
conference was convened of specialists in various areas of law to
discuss Justice Douglas' legacy." I was invited there to address
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
10. Justice Brennan himself pointed this out. 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 425 (1989).




the same subject I am addressing here: namely, the Justice's re-
ligion clause jurisprudence.12 The positions that were espoused
by Justices Douglas and Brennan were very similar, and Justice
Douglas sat on the Supreme Court even longer than Justice
Brennan. Nevertheless, Justice Douglas' opinions probably will
not have nearly the lasting impact that Justice Brennan's will.
This is an important perspective. As law students and law
professors, we tend to sit in our ivory towers and think about
the perfect opinions that we would craft if we were on the Court,
and to forget that the Court really is a political institution in
important respects. For one thing, it is a collegial body - or, at
least, it is a potentially collegial body; according to The Breth-
ren,"3 the Court also is a potentially uncollegial body!
Justice Brennan is noted for his ability as a compromiser,
his friendliness, his courteousness, his warmth, and his gregari-
ousness. I have had the pleasure of meeting him in person, so I
know that he oozes charm. It is not a false charm. You can see
that Justice Brennan is the sort of person who genuinely gets
along well with everybody. That is a quality that all of his col-
leagues on the bench - both those who agree with him and
those who disagree - say he has been able to put to very good
use to garner support for opinions, and to craft opinions that
represent compromises.
In contrast, Justice Douglas was the quintessential rugged
individualist, an eccentric, quixotic, charismatic character who
dashed off his opinions by himself, not even deigning to consult
his law clerks, let alone his brethren. For that reason, Justice
Douglas has left us a series of brilliant, but probably isolated,
statements of his views of the law. Even now, when he has not
been off the Court that long, one is already hard-pressed to find
Douglas opinions in the religion area, or indeed in other areas,
that have been picked up and incorporated into the Court's
mainstream jurisprudence.
SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN: THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (S.
Washy, ed. 1990).
12. See Strossen, The Religion Clause Writings of Justice William 0. Douglas, in
HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN: THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 91-
107 (S. Wasby, ed. 1990).





One of Justice Brennan's geniuses is that many of his ideas
and many of the jurisprudential directions that he charted may
well survive, even as the Court becomes less receptive to his ju-
dicial philosophy. Indeed, we saw that already in the last few
terms in which Justice Brennan participated. Time and again,
he wrote opinions for a five-Justice majority in cases where it
was not predictable that he would have been able to garner the
fifth vote.
It is instructive to evaluate judicial rulings not only by as-
sessing what would be absolutely the ideal opinion in the partic-
ular case. Instead, one should also assess an opinion in terms of
whether it is likely to get five votes of the current Court. More-
over, looking to the future, when we are going to have Court that
is increasingly unprotective of individual and minority group
rights, one should ask whether the opinion is crafted in such a
way that it is likely to withstand the test of time and shifting
Court philosophies. I think that Justice Brennan's political skills
are manifested in his having designed opinions on human rights
issues that obtained majority votes even from the Statist Rehn-
quist Court. I have confidence, moreover, that these opinions
will endure even through the Court's likely future shift further
from civil liberties and civil rights.
II. Justice Brennan's Religion Clause Jurisprudence
In the short time I have available to deal with the religion
clauses, I will only be able to talk about a couple of cases. There
are so many that one could dwell on. The first amendment con-
tains two religion clauses, the free exercise clause' 4 and the es-
tablishment clause. 15 I will focus on a major Brennan opinion
regarding each of those to illustrate some of his important con-
tributions in the area.
As many constitutional scholars and Supreme Court Jus-
tices have noted, there is some inherent tension between these
two clauses. 16 On the one hand, the free exercise clause seems to
14. That clause provides: "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exer-
cise of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. See supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (Burger, C.J.) ("The




mandate special treatment of religion. After all, it does guaran-
tee free exercise of religion, while it does not guarantee free ex-
ercise of any other kind of belief or ideology. On the other hand,
the establishment clause prohibits the government from favoring
religion. In short, these clauses impose governmental commit-
ments, respectively, to give some special deference to religion,
but not to treat religion specially.
In light of the tension between the two religon clauses, one
of the interesting aspects of Justice Brennan's religion clause
opinions is that they strongly enforced both clauses. He was as
strict in construing and enforcing the free exercise clause as he
was with respect to the establishment clause. I would like to de-
scribe a pair of opinions that illustrate Justice Brennan's vigor-
ous enforcement of each clause, and then discuss whether and
how those two strong positions could be reconciled, given the
warring tendencies within the two clauses.
A. Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise case on which I will focus is Sherbert v.
Verner,17 which was decided in 1963. That was the case involv-
ing the Seventh-Day Adventist who could not work on Satur-
days because that would violate her religious beliefs. When she
lost her job and applied for unemployment compensation, the
state applied its normal rule, which is enforced in most states'
unemployment compensation programs: that if an applicant ref-
uses to accept work for which she is available, then she is dis-
qualified from receiving unemployment compensation. In this
case, the Seventh-Day Adventist refused to accept a position
that would require her to work on Saturday, because of her
deeply held religious belief that she had to observe the sabbath
on Saturday. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the
Court ruled that, under the free exercise clause, the state was
required to grant an exemption to its standard availability re-
quirement for people whose sincere religious beliefs prevented
them from taking a particular job.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Sherbert was inter-
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other.")




esting and important in a number of respects. For one, it was
the first time the Supreme Court expressly had affirmed and
protected the right to engage in a certain form of conduct that is
consistent with one's religious beliefs. Earlier cases had drawn a
distinction between belief and practice, saying that individuals
have the right to their beliefs and the state may not interfere
with those, but that it may limit the practices that are moti-
vated by such beliefs.18 As Justice Brennan pointed out in Sher-
bert and in subsequent cases, it seems odd to draw that distinc-
tion when the language of the first amendment itself talks about
free "exercise." '19 That terminology seems to encompass practice
and conduct, and not to be limited simply to belief.
Justice Brennan's Sherbert opinion was also significant in
recognizing the practical impact of the state's policy. The opin-
ion noted that this policy forced the applicant to choose be-
tween, on the one hand, violating her beliefs by working on Sat-
urday, or on the other hand, giving up the essential economic
sustenance provided by unemployment compensation. 0 So the
Sherbert decision reflected a pragmatic, realistic approach. It ac-
knowledged that although the state was not literally coercing the
applicant to violate her religious beliefs, nevertheless, for all
practical purposes, it was making her pay a very high price if she
chose to abide by them. That recognition was significant, be-
cause it gave some reality to the idea of free exercise, making it
into something we could integrate into our lives and work, with-
out being asked to make economic or other practical sacrifices.
Sherbert laid the foundation for a whole series of decisions
that followed in its wake, in which the Court time after time
required religious exemptions from government measures.2" This
was true even if the measures were completely neutral, not writ-
ten to discriminate against religion, and not intentionally
18. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
19. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
20. Id. at 404.
21. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 702 (1989); Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Secur-
ity Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978) (plural-
ity opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401




targeted at religious beliefs. When states wrote the kind of un-
employment statute at issue in Sherbert, they were not thinking
of penalizing sabbatarians. The Court nonetheless said that even
when a law is written in neutral terms, if it imposes a substantial
burden on somebody's religious beliefs, then the state must
make an exception unless the state can show that is has some
compelling interest that will be undermined through this exemp-
tion. That showing could not be made in Sherbert itself.
The protective free exercise standard that Justice Brennan
formulated in Sherbert was applied in many subsequent cases.
One example is the opinion authored by then-Chief Justice Bur-
ger in 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder.2 Following the principles
Justice Brennan had enunciated in Sherbert, Yoder held that
Wisconsin had to make an exception to its compulsory school
requirement for the children of Amish parents whose religious
beliefs were violated when their teenaged children were forced to
attend a public school that inculcated secular values inconsistent
with their religion.
The Court continued to adhere to Justice Brennan's analy-
sis in Sherbert until 1990. In Smith v. Employment Division,28
which is often referred to as the "peyote case," the Court in es-
sence reversed, or at least made a very strong inroad into, Sher-
bert and its progeny.24 Part of the reason why I decided to em-
phasize Sherbert is that, as indicated by the subtitle of your
lecture series, we are exploring what foundation Justice Brennan
laid for the future. A very serious question in that regard is
whether Sherbert and its vigorous view of free exercise have
been undermined by the Smith case, or whether we can instead
view Smith as carving a limited exception to the Sherbert
approach.
In many ways, Smith involved facts strikingly similar to
those in Sherbert. Smith also involved the denial of unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. In this instance, Oregon refused to
22. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
23. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990).
24. The author has discussed Smith's undermining of previous free exercise clause
jurisprudence, as well as of individual rights jurisprudence more generally, in Strossen,
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful Enforcement




pay those benefits to two individuals who had been dismissed
from their jobs because they had smoked small amounts of pe-
yote in ceremonies at the native American Church. Oregon had a
criminal statute that absolutely banned any use of peyote, and it
did not make an exception for religious use. It was uncontro-
verted that the petitioners had used peyote only in small quanti-
ties for religious services. It was also uncontested that this ritu-
alistic use of peyote did not have any adverse impact on
petitioners' job performance.
The Supreme Court's ruling was very surprising because it
reached issues that had not been argued by the parties. On its
own, in a five-four decision, the Court abandoned the compelling
state interest/strict scrutiny test that had been laid out in Sher-
bert and followed in subsequent cases. Instead, the Court ruled
that as long as the government measure - in this case, the law
prohibiting peyote use - did not deliberately and intentionally
burden a religion, the fact that it inadvertently did so is not
enough for it to violate the free exercise clause.15
The Smith ruling was enormously upsetting to not only Jus-
tice Brennan and the other dissenters, but also to a very wide
spectrum of religious leaders and constitutional scholars around
the country. A petition for rehearing was promptly submitted to
the Supreme Court by a very unlikely coalition, including repre-
sentatives of numerous religious denominations, liberal and con-
servative organizations, foundations that support religion, and
the ACLU.2 ' The New York Times story about the rehearing pe-
tition commented that it was supported by groups who probably
did not agree on anything else, except that the robust meaning
of the free exercise clause, which had been spelled out in Sher-
25. 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
26. See, Petition for Rehearing, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
Because the Court's far-reaching holding resolved an issue not briefed by the par-
ties, because recent research on the history of the Free Exercise Clause demon-
strates that the broader reading of the Clause rejected by the Court... was con-
templated by the Framers of the First Amendment, and because assertions that
the Court has "never held" that the Free Exercise Clause requires government to
justify unintended burdens on free exercise must come as a surprise to the federal
and state courts, state attorneys general, and treatise writers who have uniformly
read this Court's free exercise decisions from as far back as at least Sherbert V.




bert v. Verner and its progeny, was seriously undermined by
Smith.2
The Court refused to grant the petition for rehearing in
Smith.2 8 However, as I am fond of telling my students, the Con-
stitution as it is interpreted by the Supreme Court is only a floor
for our individual rights. It is not a ceiling. If Congress, for ex-
ample, believes that the Court has interpreted the Bill of Rights
too narrowly, Congress can step into the breach. It looks as if
this may happen in response to Smith. A bill called the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991 has been introduced in
Congress.2 Like the petition for rehearing in Smith, this bill is
supported by the most unlikely group of allies, from the most
liberal to the most conservative, Republicans and Democrats,
and people representing all strands of religious and secular be-
liefs. I am hopeful that, by enacting this proposed measure, Con-
gress will reinstate Justice Brennan's legacy in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner into our law.
That last remark leads to a general observation: a Justice
may be influential not only in terms of writing opinions that
speak for the Court, but also through writing concurrences and
dissents, as well as writing and speaking in public forums. Such
a Justice may exert an impact on our legal system that goes far
beyond Supreme Court doctrine. William Brennan was such a
Justice.
For example, Justice Brennan was very active in the move-
ment to make state court judges aware of the possibility of en-
forcing their state constitutions in ways that are more protective
of individual rights than the Supreme Court has interpreted the
corresponding provisions of the federal Constitution to be.30
Through his writing both on the Court and off, in law reviews
and public lectures, Justice Brennan has educated a whole gen-
eration of state court justices, including in his own native state
of New Jersey, about this important role they can play to foster
individual rights. He has taught them that they can take views
27. See Greenhouse, Court Is Urged to Rehear Case On Ritual Drugs, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 10, 1990, at A16, Col. 1; National Desk.
28. 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
29. H.R. 2797, 102nd Cong., lot Sess. (1991).
30. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,




expressed in dissenting opinions at the Supreme Court level and
incorporate them into majority interpretations of their state
constitutions. He also has influenced legislators at both the state
and national level, who can translate his vision of individual
rights into legislative guarantees, even if this vision is more
rights-protective than the Supreme Court majority's view of fed-
eral constitutional law.3l
Turning back to the Smith case, it is important to note the
possibility that it could be construed relatively narrowly. For ex-
ample, some scholars have argued that perhaps one should focus
on the fact that Smith involved a criminal law prohibition. In
contrast, Sherbert v. Verner involved an unemployment com-
pensation statute and Wisconsin v. Yoder involved education
regulations. Arguably, we can hold the line here, so there will be
more deference to a state's criminal law prohibitions than to its
other laws. 2 Perhaps Smith will be limited in this way. But it is
a troubling development, which may signal further inroads into
the free exercise guarantee in the future."
B. Establishment Clause
I would now like to address Justice Brennan's establishment
clause jurisprudence. As I previously noted, Justice Brennan ad-
vocated the vigorous enforcement of both the free exercise and
establishment clauses, despite the inherent tension between the
two. Justice Brennan's vigorous enforcement of the establish-
31. An important example of a Brennan opinion that apparently exerted this type of
influence is his in Rodriguez v. San Antonio School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 62 (1973), which
rejected the majority's conclusion that unequal school financing, throughout a state, does
not violate the United States Constitution. Several states have implemented the equal
financing advocated by Justice Brennan's dissent, either through judicial interpretations
of state constitutions, or through legislative enactments. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep.
School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. 1989); Helena Elem. School Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90
(Ark. 1983).
32. For a helpful discussion of this theory, as well as other possible ways for confin-
ing Smith's adverse impact on free exercise doctrine, see Laycock, The Remnants of
Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 41-54 (1990).
33. For example, after analyzing potential limitations on the scope of the Court's
cutback on free exercise rights in Smith, Professor Laycock concludes: "One function of
judicial review is to protect religious exercise against . . . hostile or indifferent conse-
quences of the political process. The Court has abandoned that function, at least in sub-




ment clause has been noted by University of Virginia law profes-
sor Dick Howard, who has advocated strict separation between
government and religion. Given his separationist inclination, it is
significant that Professor Howard has said that Justice Brennan
"wrote opinions which are as separationist in their language as
any I can think of."'3 4
Justice Brennan is a devout Roman Catholic, and some-
times it strikes people as counterintuitive that a staunch reli-
gious believer would so strongly enforce what Thomas Jefferson
described as the "wall of separation" between church and
state.36 Yet it has been my general experience that some of the
most religious people believe they have the most at stake in
maintaining that wall of separation, not only because they think
that government should not be influenced by religion, but also
because they think religion should not be influenced by
government.
The case on which I will focus in the establishment clause
area is Aguilar v. Felton,6 . It is one of the pair of so-called
"parochiaid" decisions that Justice Brennan authored for a nar-
row five-four majority in 1985.1' These decisions invalidated
longstanding public assistance programs for parochial school
students.
I have chosen to describe the Aguilar case because it in-
volved a situation close to home, in New York City. At issue was
a federal program designed to meet the needs of educationally
deprived students from low-income families who happened to be
attending parochial schools. At the time the case went to the
Supreme Court, the program had been in existence for 20 years.
Public school teachers went to parochial schools after regular
school hours and offered to do remedial teaching in secular sub-
jects for interested students. It was a voluntary program and the
public school teachers were subject to monitoring to make sure
they did not engage in any religious proselytizing.
After 20 years of experience with this program, nobody
34. Fein, et al., The Brennan Legacy: A Roundtable Discussion, 77 A.B.A. J. 52, 56
(1991).
35. 16 THE WRNGS OF THOMAS JEFFEMSON 281-82 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).
36. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).




could give a specific example of how it had led to any inappro-
priate relationship between church and state. Nonetheless, in a
controversial decision, writing for himself and four other Jus-
tices, Justice Brennan struck down this program, ruling that it
violated the establishment clause because it would lead to an ex-
cessive entanglement between church and state. He explained
that the program required "a permanent and pervasive state
presence in the sectarian schools."3 Similarly, he noted that the
program required "frequent contacts between the regular paro-
chial school teachers and the remedial teachers."3 9
The entanglement prohibition is one of the three prongs of
the "Lemon" test, set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman"' in 1971.
Under Lemon, a measure must have a secular purpose, its pri-
mary effect must not be either to advance or inhibit religion,
and it must not entail excessive entanglement between govern-
ment and religion. In Aguilar, Justice Brennan acknowledged
that the first two Lemon requirements were satisfied. However,
he said that monitoring the parochiaid program to ensure that
there was no religious indoctrination led to unnecessary entan-
glement between the government and religion. As the dissenters
pointed out, that analysis may leave a no-win situation for paro-
chial schools; on the one hand, without the monitoring, the pro-
gram may have the impermissible effect of advancing religion,
but on the other hand, with the monitoring, the program will
involve impermissible entanglement. 1
A number of commentators criticized Justice Brennan for
his Aguilar opinion, saying he was being insensitive to the edu-
cationally deprived students who happen to be going to paro-
chial school, and thus carrying separation of church and state
too far. It is ,not surprising that this decision was criticized by
the Reagan Administration, which had argued against it through
its Solicitor General, Rex Lee, who is now the Dean of the Brig-
ham Young University Law School in Utah."2
What is more surprising is that the decision also has been
38. 473 U.S. at 385.
39. Id. at 386.
40. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
41. Id. at 666 (White, J., dissenting).




questioned by Burt Neuborne, now a Professor at NYU School
of Law, who was at the time on leave of absence from NYU to
serve as Legal Director of the ACLU."' The ACLU argued that
this parochiaid program was unconstitutional. Burt tells the fol-
lowing story about his personal insight into the case. When
Aguilar was before the Supreme Court, Burt's wife, Helen
Neuborne, was the New York City government official responsi-
ble for directing this very program, which Burt was arguing to
be unconstitutional. As he said, they had "full and fair ex-
changes" about the case at dinner a number of times!" When
the Court decided to invalidate the program, the city changed
its approach and built little quonset huts right outside the paro-
chial schools, so the remedial teachers could pick the students
up as they came out of school. And so, Burt says, his wife came
home one night and said, "You know what you guys have done?
You've got us with public school teachers in the bushes after
school saying to kids, 'Psssst, wanna learn to read?' !4
C. Reconciling Justice Brennan's Views on the Two Religion
Clauses
The foregoing discussion prompts the question whether
there is some inconsistency between Justice Brennan's strong
view of the establishment clause on the one hand, and his strong
view of the free exercise clause on the other hand. I think the
answer is that there is not necessarily an inconsistency. I would
like to sketch out some theories as to how one might reconcile
these views, which are seemingly in tension with each other.
First, I think what Justice Brennan himself would argue is
that he was simply constructing a parity between the two
clauses, because he viewed them as equally important. More-
over, he was likely relying on the original intent of framers such
43. See, id.
LEE: But for the kind of wooden, checklist approach [set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman],
the congressional scheme in Aguilar, quite clearly would have survived. For 20 years
[that scheme] had been successful. And you talk about an important and perfectly ac-
ceptable government objective. It was an affirmative action program.
NEUBORNE: Absolutely. It served minority children.





as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who took a very strict
separationist view, as revealed in Madison's "Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessments" and Jefferson's Vir-
ginia Statute for Religious Freedom.
There is a second way in which Justice Brennan's free exer-
cise and establishment clause decisions can be harmonized with
each other: both sets of opinions reflect his strong belief in indi-
vidual liberty - in the rights of the minority against the tyr-
anny of the majority. On the one hand, Justice Brennan saw the
majority intentionally imposing on minorities regarding Bible-
reading in the public schools and in other examples of state sup-
port for religion. In these cases, Justice Brennan found an estab-
lishment clause violation. On the other hand, though, even when
majorities were not deliberately imposing on religious minori-
ties, Justice Brennan read the free exercise clause as giving mi-
nority religions special protection. Under his reading of the free
exercise clause, minority religions were insulated even from the
unintentional burdens that resulted from generally applicable
laws. This vision was reflected in both Justice Brennan's major-
ity opinion in Sherbert and the dissenting opinion that he joined
in Smith.
Justice Brennan's attitude toward the interrelationship be-
tween the two religion clauses can usefully be contrasted with
that of Justice Stevens, who cast the deciding vote in Smith.
Justice Stevens can fairly be characterized as one of the Court's
strictest separationists, stricter than Justice Brennan was. Along
with Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens consistently joins in opin-
ions finding that religious preferences constitute establishment
clause violations. However, in contrast with Justice Brennan,
Justice Stevens also concludes that the free exercise clause does
not guarantee special exceptions to generally applicable laws as
to which there are religious objections. That is because Justice
Stevens views the establishment clause as prohibiting any such
exceptions. What he in effect says is, "I'm not giving any prefer-
ence to any religion under any circumstances."
In Justice Stevens' view, then, the Smith case involved a
situation where Native American Church members were asking
for favorable treatment because of their religion. Along with the
other members of the current majority on this issue, Justice Ste-




clause is equal treatment.46 That view seems to have eclipsed
Justice Brennan's contrasting view that the free exercise clause
was expressly intended precisely to give some special treatment
to religion - namely, to protect it from any government mea-
sure that imposes substantial burdens, even if that measure does
so unintentionally or indirectly.
I would like to offer a final possible way of harmonizing Jus-
tice Brennan's free exercise clause opinions with his establish-
ment clause opinions. Professor Burt Neuborne arrestingly cap-
tured this theory when he said, "I think Brennan saw religion as
the 1791 version of sex."'4 7 Is that self explanatory, or should I
read the rest of Burt's statement?! He said:
Freud tells us that sex is this tremendous drive that makes
people act in ways that we have to be concerned about. And when
the founders drafted the Constitution, I think religion was seen as
that kind of non-rational - in a nonprejorative way - a non-
rational drive that made people act in particular ways because it
was their religious destiny and religious need to do so. I think if
you view religion that way as a non-rational, enormously impor-
tant and potent force, but not a force that responds to reason,
then Brennan's religion clause jurisprudence evolves directly from
that. If religion is not rational, then individuals cannot control
themselves in the usual way that we expect, with a cost-benefit
analysis, careful weighing of benefits and burdens. So if the state
comes down on somebody and says, "You can't do something"
that your religion tells you you should, Brennan would then say
that person is put in an impossible box.
That person cannot go through the Justice Holmes bad-man
analysis: "Do I want to do it badly enough to take the conse-
quences?" That person is driven to do it, and so Brennan would
then build the largest possible dead space between the state and
that person to allow him to act out his non-rational beliefs.
Similarly with the establishment clause, where you have well-
meaning officials in power who are driven by their religious be-
liefs, they're not going to be able to stop themselves from propa-
gating their religious beliefs .... I [agree with Rex Lee that Bren-
nan's Establishment Clause jurisprudence applies a wooden
analysis.]
46. For an elaboration on this theme, see Strossen, supra note 24, at 382-88.




But that's because I think Brennan is trying to create a pro-
phylactic position. ... [H]e is afraid that once you allow a breach
at all, the religious drive cannot be controlled by the usual ration-
alistic methods of law.
And I think there is a unity to his religion clause jurispru-
dence that will survive, because his vision is so clear as to the
behavioral role religion plays in people's lives. 8
I understand what Professor Neuborne is saying, since I
have made a similar argument myself. I have said that some
strict separationists view religion the way some fundamentalists,
or politicians such as Jesse Helms, apparently view sex: as some-
thing so dangerous that you have to take prophylactic measures
in dealing with it!
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, I wanted to share one personal observation
about Justice Brennan that transcends his important contribu-
tions to our understanding of the religion clauses. At NYU
School of Law there is a prestigious lecture series on the Bill of
Rights called the James Madison Lectures. Justice Brennan is
the only person in history who has been invited to deliver two
Madison Lectures. The first one was in the early 1960's, when I
was still in grade school. The second was in 1986, and at that
time I was teaching at NYU Law School, as a Supervising Attor-
ney of its Civil Rights Clinic. So I had the great pleasure of at-
tending this lecture, which was a very moving experience.
When Justice Brennan entered the large hall where the lec-
ture took place, everybody in the room stood and gave him a
prolonged standing ovation. Many people were crying, and many
more had tears in their eyes. Since the audience included indi-
viduals with a wide range of viewpoints on legal issues, that ova-
tion demonstrated that Justice Brennan was strongly admired
even by people who did not agree with his ideas. This was true,
for example, of David Souter. When he was asked during his
confirmation hearings to state his opinion of Justice Brennan,
then-Judge Souter gave an extremely ringing, moving endorse-





If I am to explain what Justice Brennan has meant to me,
and why I was standing there at NYU with tears in my eyes,
along with many of my colleagues and students, it is this: Justice
Brennan embodies the values that had inspired me to become a
lawyer. I think he personifies the law's vast potential to respect
and expand dignity, privacy, freedom, and equality for every
human being.
Regardless of whether you have the fortune to meet Justice
Brennan in person, and despite the fact that he is no longer
writing his magnificent Supreme Court opinions, I know that
you will continue to read his past opinions, and I also know that
he will continue to serve as an inspiration for all of you and for
generations to come. Accordingly, I want to thank Pace Law
School and its Law Review for choosing to honor Justice Bren-
nan. In this bicentennial year of the Bill of Rights, you could not
have made a more appropriate choice. You have chosen to cele-
brate the person who has made the single greatest contribution
in recent memory to making the Bill of Rights a reality.
Thank you very much.
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